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The Helms-Burton Act: Title JI and

International Claims
By DAVID KAYE.

I. Introduction
Title IIof the Helms-Burton Act,' as is now well known, creates a
novel right of action: it permits U.S. nationals with claims to property
confiscated by the government of Cuba to sue, in U.S. federal district
court, persons who "traffic" in such property.2 This discussion paper
seeks to provide some context for one aspect of the international law debate over Title III, the relationship of Title IMI to traditional international
claims practice.
As an initial, introductory matter, Part II of this paper reviews the
problem which is the subject of Title Ill, the uncompensated taking of
property from U.S. citizens by the government of Cuba since 1959. It
then examines the statute itself, in particular how it proposes to deal with
the claims of U.S. citizens against Cuba in the absence of a transition or
democratic government in Cuba. Part III of this paper focuses on Title
I's relationship to international claims practice, using as a referent the
Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Juridical Committee's (IAJC) opinion
on "a law whose content is similar to that of the
3
Helms-Burton Act."
* David Kaye is an Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. Department of State's Office of
the Legal Adviser. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent those of the Department of State.
1. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91) [hereinafter
"Helms-Burton Act"].
2. Helms-Burton Act, § 302. See supra, part II.B, for a review of the nature and
mechanics of a Title III cause of action.
3. Opinion of the Inter-American JuridicalCommittee in fulfillment of resolution
AG/DOC.3375/96 of the General Assembly of the Organization ofAmerican States, entitled 'Freedom of trade and investment in the hemisphere, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
CJISO/H/doc. 76196 rev. 5 (1996) [hereinafter "IAJC Opinion"]. I use the IAJC Opin-

ion solely for discussion purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the Committee's competence to pronounce on domestic legislation of OAS member states is doubtful and that
the opinion was recognized by the Committee to have "no binding effect on Member
States or the organs of the Organization." Id., para. 2. See Statement by Ambassador
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II. The Cuba Property Problem and Title 1I
A. The Background
Between 1959 and 1961, the Castro government essentially eliminated private ownership of property as a concept in Cuban law.4 The
"lightning-quick" nationalizations s hit all persons holding property,
whether Cuban citizens or foreign nationals. However, no group of foreign nationals could come close to matching the investment holdings in
Cuba, and resultant losses, of U.S. citizens and corporations. U.S. citizens either owned or held significant investments in Cuba's electric
company, its telephone system, a wide variety of mining operations, the
petroleum sector, hotels, sugar and other agricultural products, in addition to the thousands of smaller residential and other investments made
by U.S. citizens in Cuba.
Under international law, a state may expropriate the property of a
foreign national so long as it is done for a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner consistent with minimum standards of fair process, and in conjunction with the provision of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 6 Generally, the claimant must initially seek the
remedies available under local law, but Cuban law after Castro came to
power provided no remedy, certainly no remedy that approached the requirements of due process and international law. 7 At the same time,
Cuba enacted discriminatory expropriation laws aimed directly at U.S.
citizens.8 Cuba is quite clearly in breach of its internationad obligations
on these scores, having failed to provide compensation to thousands of
U.S. citizens.
The Cuban government's early feigned attempts at providing compensation to the owners of the expropriated property were illusory, offering at best pennies on the dollar compared to the fair market value of
the properties. 9 At the same time, a negotiated government-togovernment settlement of U.S. citizen claims appears to have been rejected by the Castro government during the process of nationalization.
Harriet C. Babbit, U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American
States, General Assembly Plenary Session, June 4, 1996.
4. See generally MICHAEL GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CUBA (1976).
5. See PAMELA S. FALK, CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY 41 (1986).
6. See supra,Part III.A.
7. See GORDON, supranote 4, at 135-152.

8. See id. at 95-108.
9. Id.
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Castro, for instance, falsely characterized U.S. requests for prompt, adequate and effective compensation as, "[play now, cash on the spot, and
what we ask for our lands."' 0 While the United States "sought only to
bring about negotiation of the question of compensation, in accordance
with accepted principles of international law," Castro appears to have
rejected the principle itself, claiming a right to expropriate "without indemnity"."
By 1964, it was clear that U.S. claimants had no effective remedy to
obtain compensation in the Cuban legal system. Meanwhile, U.S. courts
were unable to provide such a remedy, as the Supreme Court made amply12
clear in 1964 in its decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.
With that background in mind, the Congress passed, and President Lyndon Johnson signed, legislation authorizing the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC") to determine "the amount and validity of
claims against the government of Cuba."' 3 Throughout the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the FCSC conducted its most extensive claims program,
and considered 8,816 submitted claims.' 4 In 1972, the FCSC certified to
the Secretary of State 5,911 claims of U.S. citizens, valued in current
dollars at nearly $6 billion. The U.S. government envisioned that these
claims would provide the basis for U.S. claims settlement negotiations
5 Title I itself does not alter the certifiwith the government of Cuba.'
16
FCSC.
the
cations made by
10. U.S. Issues Reply to Charges Made by Cuban Prime Minister in U.N. General
Assembly, DEPT. ST. BuLL. 690, 693 (Oct. 31, 1960) [hereinafter "BULLETN"l. For a re-

view of international claims resolved by lump-sum settlement that undermines the Cuban
characterization of U.S. policy, see RICHARD B. LILUCH AND BURNS H. WESTON,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTIEMENT BY LuMP-SUiM AGREE ENTs 207-17 (1975).
11. BULLETIN, supra note 10, at 693.

12. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (deciding, inter
alia, "[tihat the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this

country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking vio-

lates customary international law.").
13. Cuban Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 88-666, 78 Stat. 1110, (1964) codified, as
amended, at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643 et seq.
14. See FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE CUBAN

CLAIMS PROGRAM 412 (1972) [hereinafter "FCSC FINAL REPORT"]
15. Id.
16. Helms-Burton Act, § 303(c).
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To date, of course, these claims remain unsatisfied. The United
States and Cuba have not negotiated a resolution of these claims, nor, to
my knowledge, discussed such a possibility. On the contrary, Cuba has
stated publicly that it has counter-claims against the United States arising
from the embargo.17
Cuba has negotiated claims settlements (some of them quite limited)
with a few other governments, including Canada, Spain, Switzerland and
France, permitting it to appear willing in principle to compensate all
other foreign states for prior Cuban expropriations. 8 These settlements,
however, provide no solace to a U.S. claimant. First, because none of
these countries had the magnitude of investments in Cuba of U.S. nationals, the total of these countries' claims amounted to a tiny fraction of
U.S. claims. As a result, claims resolution with these countries was both
feasible and palatable to the government of Cuba. Second, these agreements appear to have incorporated trade agreements and preferences as
well, which are hard to imagine under the current U.S. economic embargo.
B. Helms-Burton'sApproach to Property ClaimsAgainst Cuba
The property rights problem is clearly a significant, though not
overriding, concern of Helms-Burton.19 Outside Titles HI and IV, for instance, section 206 requires that "a democratically elected government in
Cuba" be seen as having "made demonstrable progress in returning to
United States citizens (and entities which are 50 percent or more beneficially owned by United States citizens) property taken by the Cuban government from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, or
providing full compensation for such property in accordance with international law standards and practice." 20 Section 207 required the Secre17. See Pascal Fletcher, Cuba Counters Helms-Burton, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996 at
4; Larry Rohter, Cuba Measure Strikes Back at the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1997, at 5.
18. See Michael Gordon, The Settlement of Claimsfor ExpropriatedForeign Private
Property Between Cuba and Foreign Nations Other Than the United States, 5 LAWYER
OFTHE AMERICAS 457 (1973). Not all of these agreements have been published. The text
of the 1967 French-Cuban agreement is reprinted in BuRNs H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL

CLAimS:

POSTWAR FRENCH PRACTICE

193-95 (1971).

19. In fact, the Helms-Burton Act could be seen as two statutes in one. The first is
embodied by the codification of the embargo and other elements of Titles I and II and

concerns the general U.S. policy aims with respect to Cuba-the promotion of democracy, preparation of a plan for assistance of a transition or democratic Cuba, etc. The
second, consisting of Titles III and IV, is more narrowly drawn to deal with the specific
problem of Cuba's uncompensated takings of U.S.-owned property.
20. Helms-Burton Act, § 206(6).
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tary of State to prepare a report "containing an assessment of the property dispute question in Cuba," analyzing various aspects of the problem
of resolving
all Cuban property claims, not just those of certified claim21
ants
The property rights question is, however, central to Title ll 2 and to
the debate among international lawyers. The following elements of the
mechanics of Title III are critical to understanding its full scope and intention:
1. Liabilityfor Trafficking
Interestingly, section 302 is written in such a way that the trafficker,
rather than the claimant, is the focus: "... any person that, after the end

of the 3-month period beginning on the effective date of this title, traffics
in property which was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after
January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns
the claim to such property .... ", One might say that the framers of the
Act were less interested in establishing a cause of action for U.S. nationals, though clearly they intended to do just that, than in establishing a liability for persons who "traffic" in confiscated U.S. property in Cuba.
This may very well be a distinction without a difference in the law, but it
may also point to a tone or an emphasis which accords well with President Clinton's decision to allow Title IMI to become effective while suspending the right to bring an action. In both instances, the continuing liability of traffickers should work to deter persons from becoming
involved in U.S.-claimed property. 24 The three-month "grace period"
21.

Md,

§ 207(a). The Helms-Burton Act adds, "It is the sense of the Congress that

the satisfactory resolution of property claims by a Cuban Government recognized by the

United States remains an essential condition for the full resumption of economic and
diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba." Id., § 207(d).
22. I will not be discussing Title IV of Helms-Burton Act, which provides authority

for the Secretary of State to deny visas and for the Attorney General to exclude persons
who confiscate or traffic in U.S.-claimed property, without distinguishing between certified and non-certified claimant property. See Helms-Burton Act, § 401, 22 U.S.C. 6091.

Title IV continues to be implemented by the Department of State according to guidelines

published in the Federal Register on June 17, 1996. See Guidelines Implementing Title
IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30655-56 (1996).
23. Helms-Burton Act, § 302(a)(1).
24. Professor Lowenfeld recently stated his belief that "[t]he principal purpose of the

Helms-Burton Act is not to stimulate litigation, but to deter nationals of third countries
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provided for in the Act ended on November 1, 1996. As a iesult, if the
suspension of the right of action is ever lifted, liability will presumably
attach as of that date.
Trafficking itself is not a novel concept, as Brice Clagget and
Monroe Leigh have pointed out,25 but the concept of trafficking in unlawfully expropriated property is an idea which is unique to Title II.
Section 4(13) defines the term by stating that
[a] person 'traffics' in confiscated property if that person knowingly and
intentionally(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages or otherwise
disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds
an interest in confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in
trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,
of any United States national who holds a
without the authorization
26
claim to the property.
It is important to recognized that, given the breadth of this definition, it must be fleshed out by the courts in specific cases. For instance,
while the act of trafficking encompasses a wide range of commercial activities, a court would have to clarify the scienter element.
2.

FCSC Certified and Non-certified Claimants

Under the Act, until March 13, 1998 (again assuming an effective
right of action) only U.S. nationals with claims certified by the FCSC
from doing business with and investing in Cuba." Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and
Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 426 (1996). I would modify that

to emphasize that the purpose is to deter such involvement with U.S.-claimed properties
in Cuba specifically.

25. See Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with Inter-

national Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 437 n.17; The LIBERTAD Act: Implementation
and InternationalLaw: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere
and Peace Corps Affairs, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. 32-33 (July 30, 1996) (statement of
Monroe Leigh).

26. Helms-Burton Act, § 4(13)(A). Subsection (B) excludes a small set of transactions from the definition that might otherwise be considered "trafficking". In addition,
section 4(12)(B), excludes from the definition of "property" "real property used for residential purposes," unless the claim to such property is held by an FCSC-certified claim-

ant or the property is occupied by a Cuban government or party official.
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may bring a suit under Title 1i12 All of the certified claimants were
U.S. nationals at the time their claims arose, a required criterion of certification. In general, non-certified claimants are those who were not U.S.
nationals at the time their claim arose. Non-certified claimants largely
consist of naturalized Cuban-Americans. The fact that non-certified
claimants were provided a right of action has created some controversy
of its own. Some observers feel this is tantamount to a U.S. espousal of
the claim of a person who has not continuously, since the taking, been a
U.S. national. This issue is considered in more detail below.
3. Minimum Amount in Controversy
In order to bring an action, the amount in controversy must exceed
$50,000.2 On its face, this seems like a high hurdle to clear for a U.S.
claimant. However, the Act allows this amount to be calculated according to the greater value of (1) the certified amount, (2) the amount determined for a non-certified claimant by an appointed "special master,"
or (3) the fair market value.2 9 This would be a litigable issue which
could significantly increase the number of claims for which the greater
value is not obvious on the face of the certifications. Looking only to the
certified principal awarded by the FCSC, 816 claims are valued at
$50,001 or more, and 1,144 are valued between $10,000 and $50,000. A
considerable number of litigable claims under the Act can be imagined
from this latter group.30
4. Treble Liability
The deterrence element of Title m is perhaps most evident in its
provision of a right to collect treble damages from traffickers. A person
who traffics in property, a claim to which is held by a certified claimant,
is liable for treble damages, while a trafficker in property to which a
claim is held by a non-certified 31claimant, is trebly liable only if the
plaintiff provides specified notice.

27. Helms-Burton Act, § 302(a)(5)(C).

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id,§ 306(b).
Id. See also § 302(a)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(I).
See FCSC FINAL REPORT, supranote 14, at 413.
Helms-Burton Act, § 302(a)(3).
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5. Termination of Rights
Under section 302(h), the right of action will be terminated upon a
Presidential certification that a democratically-elected government has
been installed in Cuba.32 Despite Title III's focus on property, it remains
moored to the rest of the Act by a link to a transition or democratic government's existence in Cuba. It appears that the framers of the Act believed that Title III lawsuits would have a deleterious impact on either a
transition or democratic Cuba, or on U.S.-Cuba relations in general, necessitating the inclusion of this "out."
6.

PresidentialSuspension Authority

A major focus of U.S. allies and the press on Title III has been the
discretion provided the President to suspend the effective date or the
right of action upon a determination that suspension "isnecessary to the
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba. 33 The President allowed Title III to become effective on August 1, 1996, but simultaneously exercised his authority under
section 306(c) to suspend the right of action for six months. On January
3, President Clinton announced that he would renew the suspension for
another six months from February 1, 1997. This decision was entirely
consistent with (and furthered the overall goals of) the Act, and in fact,
the recent actions and statements by the European Union and Western
Hemisphere states promoting democratic goals in Cuba indicate that his
approach has succeeded, both on its own terms and in the Helms-Burton
framework. The President further stated that he "[w]ould expect to continue suspending the right to file suit so long as America's friends and
allies continue 34their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba."
III. Some Thoughts on Title III and International Claims
To date, much of the public comment on Title NII's supposed nonconformity with international law has been somewhat general and vague.
One exception was the OAS-IAJC discussion of Title III ("IAJC opinion"). The IAJC opinion is less argument than a presentation of "find-

32.
33.
34.
Burton

Id., § 302(h).
Id., § 306.
United States: Statement of the President on Suspending Title III of the HelmsAct, (Jan. 3, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 216 (1997).

1997]

The Helms Burton Act: Title m and International Claims

ings," but it provides a reference point from which we can examine Title
Ill's place in international claims law.
Specifically, the IAJC discussed "two principal areas of legal questions suggested by the legislation: the protection of the property rights of
nationals and the extraterritorial effects of jurisdiction.""' 5 Brice Clagget
and Monroe Leigh, among others, have presented strong arguments that
Title Iis consistent with international law principles for the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.36 In fact, a review of the elements of Title I
will reveal that it does not violate the basic principles of international
claims practice.
With respect to the "protection of the property rights of nationals,"
the IAJC "consider[ed] that the legislation under analysis does not conform to international law" of claims practice in a few instances. Below, I
respond to some of those aspects in order to bring the questions regarding Title I and international claims into the proper context. Following
is a review of a few of the areas covered by the IAJC opinion regarding
Title III's impact on international claims practice:
A. State Responsibilityfor Expropriation
The IAJC opinion restates the rule that expropriation, nationalization or other measures "tantamount" to them "must be for a public purpose, non-discriminatory, and accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective compensation, granting to the expropriated party effective
administrative or judicial review of the measure and quantum of compensation. 37 The IAJC discussion, in fact, echoes the view of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which states that "[a] state
is responsible under international law for injury resulting from (1)a
taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that (a) is
not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory,
or (c) is not accompa3
nied by provision for just compensation[.]"9 8

35. IAJC Opinion, supranote 3, para. 3(g).
36. See generally Clagett, supra note 25; Leigh, supra note 25 at 32-33.
37. IAJC Opinion, supranote 3, para 5(a).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FORIGN RmATiONs LAw, § 712 (1987) [hereinafter
"RESATEMENT (THIRD)"].

An early classic statement of the law on expropriatiofl may be

found in The Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, (Germany v. Pol., 1928 P.C.J.

(ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13, 1928). One may refer to the reporter's notes of § 712 of the
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It is a long-established, sovereign right of states to expropriate
property for a public, non-discriminatory purpose, with the payment of
compensation. 9 The measure of compensation required under international law has been variously described as "prompt, adequate and effective," or "just," or "full value," or a number of other formulations.
These formulations generally refer to the provision of compensation
equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking
plus reasonable interest up to the time of settlement. 40 This standard,
however, came under fire in the post-World War II years, especially in
Latin America. For instance, Garcia-Amador wrote,
[i]n determining the amount of compensation to be paid, it is necessary
to take into account equitable, practical, technical, and political considerations, as well as juridical concerns. The argument of impos:3ibility to
pay is of great importance here if one desires to remain consistent with
the idea which legitimates the institution of expropriation in generalnamely, that private interests, national or foreign, must yield to the interest of the community. It would be unjust to deprive those less wealthy,
developing countries of the power to directly exploit their natural resources and public services, industries, or other undertakings established inS41
their territory, just because of their inability to pay full compensation.
The United States has never recognized this rationale as a legitimate
"exceptional circumstance" justifying deviation from the prompt, adequate and effective standard.4 2
The IATC opinion may therefore reflect changing attitudes and
practice among certain member states of the OAS that the customary
standard is indeed prompt, adequate and effective compensation. This
would be a very positive step forward in the recognition of the property
rights of foreign nationals.

THmD for examples of bilateral agreements, international arbitral tribunal
decisions, UN debates and resolutions, and U.S. practice which restate the rule.
39. See, e.g., 8 Whiteman, DIGEST § 25, at 1020-32 (1967).
40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 38, § 712, and Reporter's Note 3;
WHITEMAN, supra note 40, at 1143-45.
41. F.V. GARCiA-AMADOR, 1 THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 332-33
(1984). For a general discussion of the debate, see Bums H. Weston, Th, New International Economic Order and the Deprivation of Foreign Proprietary Wealth: Some Reflections Upon the ContemporaryInternationalLaw Debate, in INTERNA:IONAL LAW OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INJURY TO ALIENS 89-148 (Richard B. Lillich, ed., 1983).
42. See, e.g., Whiteman, supra note 39, at 1156-70 (discussing the U.S. responses to
the Guatemalan and Cuban nationalizations).
RESTATEMENT
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B. The Form of Reparation
The IAC opinion views a state's liability as consisting of "restitution of the asset expropriated or adequate compensation
for the damage
' 3
caused, including interest up to the time of payment. A
First, the IAJC opinion's recognition of restitution as one of the two
means of making reparation for an expropriation is an implicit acknowledgment of the U.S. interest in maintaining the viability of restitution as
a means of settling U.S. claims against Cuba.44 The general principle
that restitution is a legitimate form of redress for violations of state responsibility is firmly established. This general principle was set forth in
the Chorzow Factory case establishing the methods of reparation for an
international wrong: "restitution in kind, or, if that is not possible payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind
would bear."45 In 1993, the International Law Commission adopted draft
articles on state responsibility ("ILC draft"), which noted that an injured
State may obtain from the responsible State "full reparation in the form
of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfaction and assurances and
guarantees of non-repetition.., either singly or in combination.'
Article 8, of the ILC draft, stating that an injured state is entitled to compensation "if and to the extent that the damage is not made good by restitution in kind," recognizes47 the "'primacy' as a matter of equity and legal
principle" of restitution.
U.S. practice clearly accords with this international standard. One
example of U.S. claims practice may be found in the recent U.S.Germany Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property
Claims, signed at Bonn on May 13, 1992.48 As part of that agreement,
43. IAJC Opinion, supranote 3, para 5(b).

44. Section 301(7) of Helms-Burton Act, the findings of Title III, notes that the "Department of State has notified other governments that the transfer to third parties of properties confiscated by the Cuban Government 'would complicate any attempt to return
them to their original owners."'
45. The Factory at Chorzow, supra note 38, at 47.
46. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR 48th Sess., U.N. Doe.
No. A148/10, art. 6 bis, at 142.
47. Id.at 168, 177. See also IAN BROWNLE, PRNcIPLES OF PUBLIC INERNATIONAL
LAW 461-62 (1990) (while restitution "is exceptional... it is safe to assume that this
form of redress has a place in the law...").
48. See Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, May 13,
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the Parties agreed on a lump sum settlement of $190 million (U.S.). Under Article 2(7) of the U.S.-Germany Agreement, that sum would be offset to the extent that the government of Germany "documents to the
Government of the United States that it has provided restitution or compensation to a United States national" for the claimed property. In a
similar vein, Article IX of the 1923 Convention for the United StatesMexican General Claims Commission provided that the Commission
may decide that "restitution of the property or right shall be made by the
Government affected," although the government "may elec:t to pay the
amount [of value of the property] so fixed.., rather than tD restore the
property or right to the claimant., 49 The United States government also
offers informal diplomatic assistance where appropriate to U.S. nationals
with claims of expropriation by encouraging the foreign government to
resolve the claim promptly. In many such cases, the United States has
specifically encouraged the foreign government to consider restitution as
an option for resolution of claims.
With regard to compensation, the IAJC opinion provides two formulations, and it is unclear whether this is intentional. In Paragraph
5(a), the IAJC states the rule as "prompt, adequate and effective compensation," while in Paragraph 5(b) the effective prong drops. "Effective"
has generally been seen to refer to compensation in "a convertible currency." 50 It can be assumed that the IAJC did not intend to alter its previous formulation. For instance, the inclusion of interest as a part of the
recoverable damages indicates that the Committee did not intend to deviate from the norm it recognized in the previous paragraph.
C. The Nature of Espousal
The IAJC opinion states that, "[tihe domestic courts of a claimant
State are not the appropriate forum for the resolution of State-to-State
claims. 5 1 In order to make this statement, it assumes a crucial premise,
that Title II "could have the juridical effect of... [t]ransfoiming the espousal of a State-to-State claim under international law into a domestic
legal claim asserted under internal law by a national against nationals of
third States. 52
1992, U.S.-F.R.G., T.I.A.S. No. 11,959.
49. Convention for the United States-Mexican General Claims Comrission, Sept. 8,
1923, U.S.-Mex., 43 Stat. 1730, T.S. 678 (9 Bevans 935, 939).
50. See Whiteman, supra note 39, at 1183-85.
51. IAJC Opinion,supra note 3, para. 6(a).
52. Id., para. 4(a).

1997]

The Helms Burton Act: Title Ell and International Claims

Title III cannot fairly be characterized as such an espousal by the
U.S. government. Espousal involves the diplomatic protection of one's
nationals, whereby the espousing state takes over the claim of its national, presents it to a foreign government, and, in the best case, settles
that claim on the national's behalf.- In fact, espousal is clearly recognized under U.S. law as an executive branch function. The Restatement
notes that, under U.S. law, espousal "is the responsibility of the President and the Executive Branch. The President may refuse to present a
claim, settle it by negotiation, abandon it, or join it with other claims for
en bloc resolution; he may also agree to submit the claim for international dispute settlement, whether or not the United States is obligated to
do so by international agreement."54 Provision of a domestic remedy
against third-country nationals may involve the same rem that would be
the subject of an espousal, but a private lawsuit itself is in no sense an
espousal, neither under U.S. nor international law.
D. The Rule of ContinuousNationality
The IAJC opinion correctly states the rule that, as a matter of customary international law, a state's right to espouse a claim is limited to
persons who held its nationality at the time the claim arose and continuously until the time of presentation. 55 The IAJC opinion more fully restates the principle as follows:
When a national of a foreign State is unable to obtain effective redress
in accordance with international law, the State of which it is a national
may espouse the claim through an official State-to-State claim. It is a
condition for such espousal that from the time of the occurrence of the
injury until the settlement of the claim the holder thereof must without
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMN (THIRD), supra note 38, § 902; Whiteman, supra note 39,
at 1216-19; Robert C. Kelso, Espousal: Its Use in InternationalLaw, 1 ARIZ. 1. INT'L
AND COMP. L. 233 (1982).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 38,

§ 902, cmt. 1. See also EDWIN

BORCtmHD,

THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 366-80 (1915); Dames and Moore v.

Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981).
55. IAJC Opinion, supranote 3, para. 6(b). This rule is restated in a large number of
cases before international tribunals and in diplomatic practice. For an early statement of

the principle, see U.S.-Mexican Claims Commission, July 4, 1868, reprinted in 2 JoHN
BASSETr MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATIONS 1353 (stating that "it was uniformly held
that such citizenship was necessary when the claim was presented as well as when it
arose").
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interruption have been a national of the
56 claimant State and not have the
nationality of the expropriating State.
While the principle stated by the IAJC is accurate, Title III does not
represent any deviation from it. Continuous nationality has principal
relevance with respect to international tribunals and espousal, not to domestic U.S. law that operates entirely within the United States. Title Ill
gives U.S. courts jurisdiction to adjudicate certain claims not for purposes of espousal or presentation to an international tribunal, but rather
for specific protective purposes against third-parties trafficking in
claimed property. Title III does provide persons who were not U.S. nationals at the time their claim arose with a right of action against traffickers, but as noted previously, the provision of a domestic right of action is not tantamount to a U.S. government espousal of the claim.
Moreover, the Act itself clarifies that it should not be construed as being
inconsistent with international claims practice in this regard. Section
303(c) emphasizes, as summarized by the Attorney General, that
[n]othing in the LIBERTAD Act shall be construed to requir-, or otherwise authorize the claims of Cuban nationals who became U.S. citizens
after their property was confiscated to be included in a future negotiation and espousal of U.S. claims with a friendly government in Cuba

when diplomatic relations are restored.57
By its own terms, then, Title III does not alter the certifications
made by the FCSC nor alter the potential class of claims that might be
espoused against a future government of Cuba.58 At the same time, many
U.S. citizens of Cuban descent will have claims that they may wish to
pursue against Cuba. Resolution of those non-espousable claims-for
instance, by Cuba's creation of a domestic property claims program that
allows U.S. nationals to participate-will be essential to allowing the

56. IAJC Opinion, supra note 3, para. 5(c). The blanket statement that the claimant

must "not have the nationality of the expropriating State" should be understood in the
light of the considerable body of law concerning the place of dual-nationals in interna-

tional claims practice. See Whiteman, supra note 39, at 1252-61. For instance, the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal has adopted the rule for dual U.S.-Iranian nationals of dominant
and effective nationality, permitting certain claims to be resolved even where the claimant holds Iranian nationality. See, e.g., David Stewart, The Iran-UnitedStates Claims
Tribunal: A Review of Developments 1983-84, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677, 687-691
(1984).

57. Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955, 24,957 (Dep't of Just. 1996).
58. See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 1, § 304(b)-(c).
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Cuban economy
to put its past behind it and begin to develop its rich re59
sources.

The U.S. government carefully adheres to the basic elements of the

norm of nationality in its claims practice, using the principle of continuous nationality as an essential criterion in its evaluation of requests for
diplomatic protection. 60 A somewhat recent statement of U.S. policy
held that "[e]spousal of any kind of claims of persons who were not citizens of the United States at the time of loss or damage would establish a
major departure in6 U.S. claims practice that would be inconsistent with
international law." '
E. Liabilityfor Trafficking

The concept of trafficking as a matter of international law was the
subject of some commentary by the IAJC, which concluded that, "[Tihe

claimant State does not have the right to attribute liability to nationals of
third States for a claim against a foreign State."62
A series of premises underlie the IAJC's conclusion. The first is

that "[a]ny use by nationals of a third State of expropriated property located in the expropriating State where such use conforms to the laws of

that State, as well as the use anywhere of products or intangible property
not constituting the expropriated asset itself, does not contravene any

59. For discussions of how Cuban claims may be resolved, see Kern Alexander and
Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist Cuba, 27 LAw & Pouacy IN
INT'L Bus. 137, 175-186 (1995); MATIAS TRAviEsO-DAZ, ALT.RNATivE RE EImS IN A
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE U.S. NATIoNA.s' EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS AGAINST
CUBA (1995) (manuscript on file with author); ATLANTIC CoUNciL, A ROAD MAP FOR
RESUCTURING FUTURE U.S. RELATONS WITH CUBA 13-19 (1995).
60. It should also be noted that the respondent state may waive this rule if it so
chooses. For instance, in the settlement of the case involving the assassination in Washington, D.C., of former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier and his assistant, Ronnie
Moffit, the Chilean government agreed with the United States to the presentation of the
claims of Letelier's survivors, non-U.S. nationals, to a special commission. See ChileUnited States Commission Convened Under the 1914 Treaty for the Settlement of Disputes: Decision With Regard to the Dispute Concerning Responsibility for the Deaths of
Letelier and Moffit, Done at Washington, January 11, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1, 5 (1992). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 902, cmt. i.
61. MARIAN NASH, 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNn'ED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw

1981-1988, at 2291 (1995).

62. IAJC Opinion, supra note 3, para.6(c).
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norm of international law." 63 International law, it is true, has not previously recognized the wrongful nature of trafficking in unlawfully expropriated property. Nonetheless, the absence of a norm recognizing the
wrongful nature of trafficking does not disable the United States from
creating a narrow civil remedy intended to protect the interests of a large
class of U.S. claimants in the unique situation created by Cuba's confiscations.
Secondly, the IAJC opines that liability may not be attributed to
third-state nationals "for the use of expropriated property located in the
territory of the expropriating State where such use conforms to the laws
of this latter State ...

."64

In the abstract, it may be that this rule is both

desired and accepted by a majority of states. However, in this instance,
it is again unclear why conformity with the local laws of Cuba in particular necessarily disables the United States from recognizing damages
done to U.S. claimants by third-state nationals trafficking in confiscated
property. The unique interests of the United States in deterring trafficking in U.S.-claimed property in Cuba are good cause for exception from
the general principle.
Finally, the third premise underlying the IAJC statement is that Title
III may have the effect of "[a]ttributing responsibility for acts of a for' 65
eign State to private persons who might be nationals of third States."
Title III does indeed attribute responsibility to "trafficker;," but it does
not do so by transferring the responsibility of the government of Cuba to
the trafficker. Rather, it establishes, as a matter of domestic U.S. law,
that persons who "knowingly and intentionally" traffic in U.S.-claimed
property are liable to the U.S. claimant. Indeed, Title III's right of action
seeks to deter, and creates liability for, present and continuing wrongstrafficking in unlawfully expropriated property after November 1,
1996-not the initial wrongful expropriation. Buttressing the fact that
the government of Cuba remains responsible for its unlawful
expropriations, section 302(h) provides for the termination of the right of
action against traffickers upon the President's certification of a
democratic government in Cuba. This democratic govermment would
remain responsible to resolve the property dispute, although the United
States might be able to provide certain kinds of technical assistance and
advice to allow it to do so in a way that permits a stable transition to
democracy.
63. Id., para. 5(e).
64. Id., para. 6(d).
65. Id., para. 4(c).
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One might, however, point to section 302(f)(2)(A) of the Act as evidence that responsibility for the original expropriation by Cuba is transferred-or let's say, shared-by virtue of the trafficker's involvement in
the claimed property. This subsection of the Act limits the ability of a
certified claimant to recover from a possible settlement amount reached
between Cuba and the United States in the future, to the extent that the
claimant has recovered damages from the trafficker. In other words, a
successful Title I plaintiff-claimant would be treated as having elected
not to pursue remedies against the government of Cuba in the event of an
espousal of claims by the U.S. government. To the extent that Title EIl
plaintiffs successfully recover from traffickers, it might be said that liability has, in some sense, been transferred to the trafficker. Assuming
arguendo the existence of such a transfer of liability, it would nevertheless not have the effect of eliminating the wrongful nature of Cuba's expropriation.
In any event, it still remains to be shown that international law contains any principle or rule that would deny the United States the right to
create such a domestic civil remedy. Title III's establishment of liability
may indeed be novel under state practice, but the absence of a prior
practice does not mean that it violates international law. Thus, there is
little support for the statement that "[t]he claimant State does not have
the right to impose liability on third parties not involved in a nationalization through the creation of liability not linked to the nationalization or
unrecognized by the international
law on this subject, thus modifying the
'
juridical bases for liability."
Aside from the lack of a clear rule of customary law denying the
United States such a "right," there are good reasons for recognizing a
very narrow exception in unique cases such as the one at issue in HelmsBurton: namely, the mass nationalization of property of foreign nationals, carried out in a discriminatory manner, without the provision of an
effective domestic remedy to obtain compensation and without the willingness to provide compensation in a negotiated settlement. Thus, the
purpose of imposing such liability must rest, as Title 1I does, on a valid
protective or effective principle.

66. Id., para 6(e).
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F. Due Process
The IAJC opinion states that "[tihe claimant State may not deprive a
foreign national of the right in accordance with due process of law to effectively contest the bases and the quantum of claims that may affect his
property." 67 The principle of due process is firmly established in both
international and U.S. law. Recalling of course that Title 1U lawsuits are
suspended, one must remember that the Act itself does not alter the basic
rules of personal jurisdiction in U.S. federal district courts. Any lawsuit
that could be brought would yet be required to comply with the U.S.
standard, which surely comports with the international standard, for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. In addition, the Act it.self provides
ample opportunity for a defendant to challenge the elements of the claim
against him (i.e., scienter, the acts that constitute 'trafficking,' the ownership and amount of the claim, etc.), all of which might be difficult to
prove in federal court. Thus, concerns with respect to Title M's impact
on due process rights of "traffickers" are misplaced.
IV. Conclusion
As noted, trafficking in U.S. claimed property in Cuba complicates
an eventual resolution of the Cuban claims by removing one possible
means of settlement-restitution. With thousands of unsatisfied claims,
including many large ones which would be compromised by trafficking,
it is reasonable for the United States to allow its nationals with valid
claims to seek remedies in U.S. courts. Title Il very narrowly seeks to
preserve the rights of U.S. claimants and provides them with a tool to do
that. The Title III remedy may be extraordinary, but it is wholly reasonable when seen as a specific, narrow response to the problem of unlawful
confiscations by the government of Cuba, rather than a general practice
to be undertaken by the U.S. government in all cases. Title III's right of
action is anchored into the Act in specific ways and thus is a calibrated
response to a unique situation, the inability to recover from a government
that for over four decades has not met its responsibility under international law to provide compensation.
67. Id., para. 6(g).
68. Any doubt that it would be difficult to obtain jurisdiction over defendants or
their property in Title III cases may be eliminated by reading the major U.S. Supreme
Court cases on "minimum contacts" jurisdiction. See, e.g., Intematicnal Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

